

















The basic intent of ti ' stllne information
*?hieh ?:•!;']- I utilised to provoke* mature thinking on the part of
the younger officers concerning the oraetlee of economy in t:
services. Time has limited me to only partial coverage of t
broad subject. It : surprising th *e, that some
of the thoughts contained in these pages may seen somewhat sketchy
or that more extensive examples are not included. Critics may
find certain si: nts insufficient!: d or implying con-
tradictory concepts. .:'.'anaion of this paper to adequately ex-
pla tch statevents sight at least double the time, verbla
and redundant- ->loyed to tell the- story thus far. However, it
is ' that such mat' as is presented will demonstrate t:
tenor of the effort advocated spirit in which it is
offers
.
It is fully realised that many of th© p: :os herein
stated are oversimplified and that factors bearing on the economy
problem are a-:; complex as the natures of the people involved;
however, the majority of military officers --robably not
posed to sufficient information to provide them with a full cc
prehension of their respective parts in our efforts. oh this
in mind, the subject matter is presented in a 1« ch
should be generally intelligible to the officer corps of the
servic i
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The role of the United states as world power and its
asaumption of leadership in the affairs of the fr< rid has
brought about heavy demands on the resources of this country in
the forms of men, money, &n& raateriala. In the tme of t)
aggressive pressures exerted by the Soviet bloc of nations, our
national leaders have determined that large standing military
forces are necessary to the backing and ntatlon of our
efforts to maintain peace and to better the lives and goals of
the world's free peoples, Since th- rtain limitations
on the extent of resources available to accomplish these alas,
a high degree of economy in the utilization of these resources
is mandatory if we are to stretch I ,o cover our canal- 8*
art in the military services is to create the greatest
possible concentration of force, or firepower, out of such r
sources as are allowed to us, L.ich my be . lad at points
decried appropriate by our national leadership* It has bet
observed that the great majority of personnel in the Navy
only a small conception of the reasons behind economy requir -
ments and of their moral obligations in actively assisting f
.jrt toward economy? there is at best an extremely
understanding of the relations) tip between the common denominator
of military resources, the tax dollar, and sval • :t,
concentrated firepower* It is intended in this paper to ie
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a somewhat simplified explanation of the forces and ideas behind
the necessity for economy. The philosophy set forth herein night
well be used as a basis for the indoctrination c echelon
personnel in the supportinc cooperation required of them to cr<
the maximum concentration of power tvithin resource limitations set
upon us. It is further intended to show how proper comptroller-
ship attitudes can aid and implement such indoctrination,
oryone knows that his taxes are more than he would 1'
to p*j . Most people are equally eonsc of th- -it that
money to run a government and to maintain naval forces must come
from taxes collected from the oopulace and various business
enterprises* But two questions arr ed by the layman:
at is the proper proportion of taxes and government services?'
and "How can we alter things to set sore servtc less
taxes?" It Is intended to d ose matters in subsequent
chapters*
The question of availability of resources is one * is
familiar to many | o in wartime, but which Is cwiy vaguely
encountered in other times* It is intended to show that resources
in peacetime are I important in our economic pattern, tho
the emphasis in degree and category may not be the same as in
total war* A major portion of the subsequent matter will deal
th the conservation and utilization o '
ill has been made of the fact that t: is no it
motive" in the military services which would previ ontlve

toward economical t of resources. This contention Is
only partially valid, Many businesses arc conducted in sr
manner that no material profit accrues? to Its employees, Y
morale stay be I mi the business may expand, 1 rofit" in
the conduct of military services may be considered to be eco-
nomics effected In the use of * -lies rhich aft<
converted to a greater number of ships f military divisions, or
air squadrons which lr. turn would augment the concentration
firepower* On the other hand, it may be regarded as economies
Leo result in reduced taxes or in the allocation of unneeded
military funds to other p& es such as building of schoo 1
roads, rither way, tt least a part of our "profit tore" is in
providing ourselves with something we do fi by reducing
unnecossary or "unprofitable*' elements of military efforts. It is
applicable in both wartime and times of peace.
It is realized that the effort toward economy runs counter
to many of our natural ambitions and frailties. It is no bonanza
for the empire-builders. It counteracts the efforts of i 1
uals who would favor larrc staffs to do some of the thinking and
wetlt that they should do themselves t or those who would build a
ett of Utopian service el effort rould be at a minimum and
."fringe beliefits" at their maxi®, v: , are more than a t
of these types employed by I srviei a Rather it places
an obligation on everyone to out amble
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The serious question of how great our national military
effort should be is i I the highest offices and
councils of the nation for an answer. The H&tlaQft] arity
Council and The Joint Chiefs of Staff are both che- th
reapcnsibllitie ultimately amount to determination be
scope of this effort. The process is nmsr simple. It is much
acre than a laatter of estimating the wor3 litieal and rsilitary
situation and then fixing a budget ceiling *?' ive us
reasonable protection. The pronortio? military effort not
only ta?:e into account the effect of a large military aachir
the total ecenemy | they go I I to the n.orality and necessity of
siaklng war itself.
As means which appear to foreshadow the doom of civili-
sation, such as the hydrogen bomb, are develope nder
the actual elimination of war. On the other hand, should
not be considered as renunclatlor. ' litary preparedness j
In the past, when this i< t in tory of
the relations betwc: r and Civilization has been reached
and recognized, serious efforts have sometimes been made
to rid o ^ in time to mve society, and these en-
deavours have b^tm apt to take one or other of
tive directions.
. , # A personal refusal to lend hims
in &ixy way to any war waged by ! ate for smy pur
and In any circumstances is a line of attack against
institution of u'ar that is likely to 1 to an it
and self-sacrificing nature? ay comparison, the alternative
peace strategy of seeking to persuade and ac overr-
ments to combine In jointly resisting aggression ^hen it
comes and in tryIns to remove its stimuli beforehand may
seen a circuitous and unherolc line of attack am the problem.
mA<»

Yet ©xr to date indicates unmistakably, In the
3sent writer 1 s opinion, tha; id of these two hard
roads is by far the more spools inn .1
The concept of joining to r- aggression has been utilized in
past history, but never to the extent now evident. It Is pres-
ently exemplified in the at ions, Horth Atlantic Treaty
Organization, and various mutual >rt pacts among nation?
the free world. Through such instmments the size of our own
military effort is tempered by inducing other nations to build
forces which, in combination with ours, will cause the provoca-
tion of war by an sgrressor to appear catastrophic. At the same
time military efforts can be held within limit. Ich will pro-
vide a good climate for improvement of the welfare of all les
concerned.
Should anyone desire to go deeper into causes, he may
wonder at reasons for his existence or the reasons for and the
effects of war, :.-ueh a discussion, vhlXa illuminating, is beyond
the scope of this paper, Suffice it to say, however, that a
search through various r*a4inga of history end philosophy should
temper anyone's balance of perspective between a policy of fen
and of reaching humanity's goals by other methods, Religious
teachings and the dissertations of philosophers end to mellow
thtafring along thei® lines. Dr. Vanncvar Bttafa has written some
mold Soynbee. Vftr, flnft gmUgtUgflU •*« Albert V.
ler (Hew Yorkt Oxford University Press, 1?$0), ix.

searching passages in his ijgj^m AfflM frA4 i?m ff?B2 concerrJ.ii/; the
development of life and 11 >r survival, •oachinc fro©
another direction, Arnold Toynbee has
t . indeed subscribed to the conclusion—-no new
discoveryJ—that *se! to ha\e been the proximate
cause of the breakdown of every civilisation which is
known for certain to have broken down, in so far as it has
been possible to analyse the nature of these breakdowns
and to account for their occurrence #3
Intensive reference to such literature night indeed tend to bring
us to paolfistic or isolationist t : ^ere it not for the
history of nationt ill have allowed themselves the luxury of
such thinking. On the other hand, too narrow a view toward the
announced aims of Communism and resultant submission to fear
complexes sight have the danger t a hypemllitar
economy, and this internal 6^nger would be at least e -as
the menace from outside* The sise of our forces, :
be a synthesis of all of these cone
account the abstract considerations as well a:- cold hard facts
of available resources. It must be reasonably palatable to
people i&t^ sufficiently obvious reasoning to elicit
their sunnort. As a tradition the Unite: tes, of course, does
not us* aggressive warfare as an instrument of policy, and
ventlve war holds favor in relatively few circles. In practice,
therefore, our scope of preparedness oust assuHie such pronortions
that ve provide some reasonable defense while at the same time
'WHIWWII 1— n
2Vannovar Bush* Mc^ern Arma and roe ^en (New Yorkt
mon and Schuster, 19*9), XIII, 171-192.
oynbee, o? a c^vo vli *

tailoring our force for rapid expansion and for rapid i tlon
of the offensive in case of attack. Instead of building vast
reserve stocks of equipment which may deplete resources .ever
be used, our mobilisation capability must :ely on the continuing
expansible productive capacity of industry together with rel
tively smell reserve stocks needed during the early stages of
mobilisation. Manpower requirements must be met by a moderate
force in being coupled with a vigorour and readily callable re-
serve program, within these limitations, emphasis on various
defense activities is indicated best by President Eisenhowers
rrt, a realistic limitation of armaments ana enduring,
^ust peace remain our national goals? we maintain powerful
military forces because there is no present alternative -
forces designed for deterrent and defensive purposes alor
but able instantV/ to str . ~ck with destructive power in
response to an attack*
I md, we mast stay alert to -he fact undue reli-
ance on one weapon or preparation for only one -r-
fare simply invit; enemy to resort to anoth- t,
therefore, keep in our armed forces balance and flexibility
adequate for our pu: a and objectives.
Third, to keep our armed forces abreast of the advances
of science, our military planning murt be flexible t:
to utiliz '..he now weapon.*; ?n£. tcchni flow ever
re speedily from our resear* ?ograr;s, . . .
Durth, pending a world agreement on armament limita-
tions, we must continue to improve and expand our supplies
of nuclear weapons for our land, naval and air forces while,
at the same time, continuing our encouraging progress in
the peaceful use of atomic power.
And fifth, in the administration of these costly prorrams,
we must demand t in efficiency and incenuit .
must assure our people not only of adequate protection but

also of a d( be carried forward fro© year to
year until the threat of a lion has disappeared, 4
All of these eonsi ions i:aply a bullduo of some segments of
defense at the exnense of others, and they nc tate a maximum
development of righting potential within tns limitations of re-
rces allowed for our eu^loyiaent,
'
, ttj is the scope of our nilitary effort* It 6
rives from a reasoned balance among the philosophies expressed
above and the hard facts pertaining to our existence*
In summation, the military is but one phase of a national
endeavor which not only provides our dally necessities but «
attempts to assure these things:
1, The greatest freedom to individuals to pursue V eir
chosen ways of life,
2, The growth of our economy and welfare of our
people,
3, The assistant*. foreign los to advance and
defend themselves,
4, Tho necessary govt L controls for fchi eemmon
good.
5» national security forces, \ in ©ombinatifiij with
those of oth'-r nations, will deter aggression or m
out bringing us to our econc r\Qes m
mm»«mmtm*m<m 'm
^President Dvlght D, isenhoser, jtjjflaqrfj fa ti-,.
w.^ /fo .l .on, presented Ln hia Message to Con • on Januerj i ,
1955 < ington, D- C,: sVashington Poet and Times Herald,




The United states has emerged from Vorld V.-ar II both as a
leader In r?orld affairs and a protector of its freedoms. Exten-
sive resources have been marshalled to accomplish our Inherited
responsibilities and goals. The resources at our e d consti-
tute a considerable supply and a great proportion of tl ^ld f s
total; yet there exist scarcities when viewed from specific angles.
If the scarcities are understood and acted upon appropriately, the
common good may result. If they are not understood hy those of
all echelons ^ho employ resources, we will almost surely continue
to hoard and waste resourc ore profitably em-
ployed In other fashions. One e most Important things for
military lei to understand is that the building of the
nation* s potential requires the allocation of vital resources to
;aany other activities besides military installations and hard
goods, and besides soldiers, airmen and sailors. Unfortunate!;
this concept appears not to permeate the services far enough,
that the military man (and the civil servant) is zealous in pro-
viding himself with the resources to accomplish his assigned
duties is comsendablei that he too seldom strikes a rational
balance in his requirements is not, * other ignorance, self-
aggrandizement, or n* once causes wastage of resources, a
program for educating personnel in basic aims and policies, in
:ltatlon3 on availability of resources, and on efficient





appropriate to discuss military resources in relation to the total
economy of the nation.
?nomie re ources are employed in several ways in this
country, which, ^?hile not directly a function of a military de-
partment, still contribute to the military potential of the nation.
The more obvious activities are foreign aid, MBAP, atonic energy,
nn<3 economic mobilization? more subtle contributions are throu
health and education programs, roadbuildlng and other subsidize-
tion of transportation, agricultural programs, and propaganda
efforts. nilitary personnel usually do not think of these things
as military, and indeed they probably should not. Kather they
should consider their mm military activities as an extension of
the whole civilian effort. There is an urgent m®& for r.dlitary
officers to become better acquainted with and to worfe more closely
with the civilian component of our society. is adequate
consciousness of the Tact that civilian production and invention
are important it^ma in the military process, but It appears th-
few military mm below senior ranks realize the extent to which
the success of military activities is dependent on civilians and
on efficient allocation oarce resources to various other
facets of the nation* s endeavor. Though the importance of
military forces should not be slighted, we must emphasize the
breadth of the effort which becomes our national security. A
strong presentation of the relative place of our military in the
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picture Is mad© by !!anson Baldwin*
Victory in modern war Is no loader won by the big bat*
talions but ' factories, 1 by the big labora-
tories and the busy scientists. This has been increasingly
true since trial revolution; Forrest's "to nit
thar fust with t" nor must I :;'ar>hrased to "git
thar fust with the greatest fire power, M l
Modern mr is "total" far beyond the Imagination of even
those who coined the phrase? it enlists the whole effort of
the nation and directs the flowing stream of history, . . .
Total war means total effort, and the peacetime preparations
for it must be as comprehensive, at least in outline for
,
as the execution of it. Consequently the effects of total
war transcend the period or? hostilities: they wre nd
distort and twist the body politic and the body m Ic not
only after a m,r (as we are now seeing) but prior to r» * •*
Although we may not all &?>re® with the strength of this argument,
we should still understand that preparedness is not the business
of the few ailit' :.-,., but of the many, including indui'tr;-. Con-
sequently, our resources must be divided in accordance with our
intended scope of military activity.
3
Military resources, in a broad sense, include personnel,
materials, and funds, inee the price of each of these resources
is convertible to monetary uni. > here is a natural tendency for
the uninformed to assume that our difficulties can be overcome
by the simple expedient of obtaining more appropriated (or
allotted) funds, insufficient thought is given by such pars
Sanson
,
Baldwin, BMLFrtiM of . . $ (Her
748 ) .14, lir. BaleLondon: Harper ft Brothers. 19 14. B dwin is a military
critic for the Hew York Tiiaes, it the time he wrot Is bo
the author was chairman of a study group on "National Power
Foreign Policy" constituted by the Council on foreign Relations
for whomj^e ,-^ce, p./, c^z is published.
'




to limitations and relationships encountered in the employment of
military resources* Ince requirements for men* money* end
materials are usually generated by field interpretation J-
quarters plans* and since formulation of requirements is mc
frequently on an historical basis* the demands of fleet or field
units are not infrequently highly inflated by the time fc!
come converted to dollars. A padded or •'ji-st-in-c
addition to a reasonable requirement may result in multiple
increases in supporting requirements* Hot only does this bring
about wastage of resources* but it incurs the distrust of
! pass
and public if discovered, 'rements*. therefore, at
actual needs* but sust include a minimum of eonti. and
unproductive conveniences.
Observation indicates that the use of military resources
might be Improved by a pro,r{ram of education for pernonr- rving
in units or junior staff capacities. Officers and official* in
hi ' isitlons oJ' riles
of an operating f" M) establishment and* re
undoubtedly in a position to see a wide view of the Jlavy'a metis
,
they are often elaborately screened by subordinates findi;
twisted motion or inadequacies in their organizations* an
inadequacy is the great lack of unci on the part of unit
officers tad concerning the limitation* involved in the em-
ployment of personnel bM materials. That %hm - ? ftf t anou= '
money is usually well understood! that the reasons ind
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this scarcity is a cumulative failure to achieve the best utiliza-
tion of men and materials is not generally comprehended* By under-
standing ev^n to a partial extent the sac if our problems,
junior personnel may achieve collectively a very significant
savings in their usage and requirements of aien and materials. It
is probable that in any educational program of the sort antici-
pated treatment of the subject can be nd
no phase can be covered sufficiently to tell a complete story*
However | enough information should be disseminated - et across
the point that (1) fulfillment of military requirements represents
a tremendous number of economic , political and social compromises*.
and (2) that field personnel themselves hold an important key to
providing more and better combat units within limitations of the
resources available. In addition, it si ?inted out that
wartime conditions would impose even greater obligations for
conserving resources; times of peace, therefore, should be util-
ised in part in seeking methods for accomplishing such conservation.
There are other considerations of econo, teiency
which belong to a study resource utilization, some of which
are organizational or which relate to differences between i-
tions of peace and war or between forward area and v«^t area
employment
:
. . * the possibility of increasing efficienc. he
military departments depends very largely unon the ility
of changing the systems within these departments* t such

changes are systematic, not piecemeal* and most are gradual
over severs! ye: m* not rapid and sudden* It Is probable
that the mos' -rinciple t em any such changes
Is that of authority ility. In the military,
this principle, t i widely preached* is also widely defec-
tive in that the authority and responsibility for I
resources , whether monetary or expressed in other terns, is
not coequal with that for acconpllr . The budget system
is relevant to this problem, but is only part of it.
budget ©an provide the mechanics ? lavement and
cost are systematically related at every echelon. But the
usefulness of such measures depend a activations and
incentives, themselves intimately related rrsniz&tional
patterns m tystw nnel administrati
Itimately, the hone c efficiency in % llitary
departments hi: on the adaptation to this frttM of
reference of t> • personnel system,*
The attitude of most people is perhaps to accomplish what they
believe to be a reasonahl; thin the instruct-;, ued
to them. A smaller grou^ believes in getting by on as little work
as possible. In either case, there is a ffreet tendency tc
own nests or to put individual desires ahead of the team I t.
nomy requires a teem effort to make it effective. It r es
capable leadership by military conmandcrs wha are chosen in a
higher £er?®e of selectivity in lower echelons than now exists.
The present "career-planning" oraetice of attempting to spread
•aeh leadership billet among as many persons as tbla tends to
engender mediocrity. If a man has a moderately decent record,
turn will come. nmd not put forth extra efforts or be highly
•competitive in utlookj the desirable 3ob will px >e
an to him. The outstanding nan in turn realises that he has
4
(Hew York i Am ~ tratfwl Press, Inc., 1954), r ! -Id.
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not achieved any great success vflxen he attains a ;rable spot
and his incentive is blunted. I an;.' a£ these person ;:in to look
totmrd other fields where personal satisfactions may .
->ra
highly whetted and achievements seem more worthy of attainder
It Is the latter • I of man we n%®& to retain t less
ambitious and thoughtful in gettir t most out of our resourc
In any treatment, of economics of military resources, how-
ever! we shoula not lesve the impression that standards are the
same in all places. Under combat conditions many actions and
gatttlrattantl not be efficient in rear areas aid be
quite acceptable or eve. ys
• economy and efficiency are relative term?. They
are relative t< i*stions f
vironment fdthtn anion such organizations operate, and to
the time at which they ai rating, I us that
the Ameri- have tc same
standards of "« or the equ^ !y of
our soldiers in -
I
Ml as 1 employed by the Chinese,
Li! t we cannot a y as a Le f "or
example | the same st -da as might be by a private
business engaged in making money for atoa ira* Re*
would America tolerate the a&m in
war. Kie standards applicable to different elements of
the Array at the same time are different; i
expect , for example
v
that guns ant! ammunition on a hill-
top in Korea be "conserved" in the same vmy as on a
target range at Fort Bix, nor that, under - vhese
situations | be e-rrldered in the same way as they are
at an arsenal. o are willin t many ( r£
additional dollars be invested in @v$ry airplar pro-
vide the individual pilot a perhaps very slight advantage
ver his potential adv las*?
^Ibid. t 236

IT subject is exceedingly broad. liven in succeeding
chapters it 1 -tially covered. However, V, era
on materials, manpower, o: I f will at lea tm a ; ! m




Of the three basic forms of military rcsor
,
moteri
(including: capital equipment) are probably the least critical in
times of ?eace. Their availability is usually t lined not so
much by physical limitations, but by Hesitations on funds avail-
able. In wartime the allocation o£ materials and replacement of
capital equipment is if had on a basis of most important
needs first. , It is encumbent m military pe ml
to conserve} materials v.-hich are not obtainable in the quantities
we desire, ""here do wa look for important changes in consumption
of material resources? ISany specific areas come to mind, but It
appears that they can generally be classified in the following
groups
i
(1) Basis tm requirements
(2) Ovv. klflcatl •
(3) Upkeep, utilisation ;vfc,
one of Un ' -fields for conservation
materials is in realistic requirements. This field als^
passes the factor; It In the above list, oversoecl-
fleation, the manner of upkeep, and replacement needs may have
nearly as strong effect on material requirements as the basic
material or capital eq- At requirement itself. Formulation




which the materials arr . An it era which does a -rve the
purpose for *hl*h it ^a produced may be a partially or «i
wasted venture and, therefore, a wasted resource, n the other
hand, a certain amount of material must be on hand for combat
contingencies even though it
,
requirements
are based on a different scale of ecor;. han are requirements
for supporting elements? indeed aconosay should not be a orinary
consideration where life is at tl But even here the hard
facts of material scare . -ay require attention to f ic
inter n of all needs to provide for the best security.1
Conservation of resources is inf" fc by basic
concepts and planning* In the past ftp* years, ?m instanc j
Kavy hag encountered a limit to the amount it can load upon Its
ships vithout specialising in ship types, and z.-'-y Jum-
bal r convcr --ra ^n^ submarines Tor special pwrpom .
Although most officers feel that a fighting unit be as
versatile as possible, v.*oetie><l c-nsideratic: lit
limitations on versatility; as a result i
qulreaents vtx£ defer to specialisation to the extent neo
In th< '7*8 air arm there has been a basic re;
some years for a general if typo aircraft
•Id do all thlnrs (air I *t, reconnaissance, air-to-air
combat) moderately well, J-uch an aircraft is entirely realistic
'ield, or Defense |
M
^rv^rd
ftuatafigg RrrtffWi ( tober, 1953), 3
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and reasonable if we have r advantage In our on-
es to clvc us the perfonaanc -raensur:- c.se
missions* It is not renlistic and reasonable i . aircraft
cannot be fitted vfith the power t -age the enemy in the air on
a aomparable basis, 11 I then be necessary to specialise oar
types of aircraft within the I
'
have thus
far been I* to 4 . ecent general purpose aircrc-
built under such requirements can do air suoport only ."airly j
being a Jet type, it uses a great deal of .fuel at lov tit!
hence cannot remain Ian station %i vide support, and it
sacrifices bomb load for fuel and air-to-air gunnery eoj at.
As a fighter aircraft , it sacrifices performance due to external
bomb appendages and. the internal structure necessary to support
and lift boobs « The aircraft loses about fifte -^cent or its
performance - PtBftj eliob p -'joanee, , ancl stability -
<Sua to the appendages clone, As a result, aircraft is only
moderately good as an air support type and of co&parati*- Little
value as a fighter Bifida it cannot approach t: ;inc capabil-
ities of our po-?si Id counterparts. In addit! - "• ll
carries so much safety equipment that, vMle the pilot is re
tively secure in hi? craft, his performance due t 'ticnal
.weight (-without necessary power advantage) reduces very
United fighting capability, complicated
than stated above, but it illustrates how excess!' its

can result In questionable employment of resources. 'die it
lid be argued that the above mentioned aircraft would make a
good trainer, m m still not provided at that time with the
fighter aircraft we needed to defend our :..". .? course,
8pactaligation must be cached with caution to minimize space,
manpower and logistic requirements. Perhaps the requisites of
interception and air-to-air maneuvers are the only ones nfeifl
would justify specialization in this aircraft example. In any
event, the moral of the y Is apparent. Bequirements for
basic materials Bust be based on good adequate plann:! ttt on
logical, reasonable assumptions.
Buying in excess oC require I is justifiable for
bat needs, but it should be held to proport ich ^ill not
deprive of. >rces '-oasenable reserTr
Excesses in sur>portinp fields cannot be Just? on the same
basis, particularly In our large admlnlstrati 'fart*
funds are doln?, curtail a buying,^ but even here
there may be requirements stmd sore from < i-
lence than need. rj is or©sently faced with a huge Inven-
tory problem Involving excess stoe 1* little used or obsolete
equipment which require vast efforts in time for
accountability. i problem is bain led by a tarn eonec
of supply control and the inventory position I Erring* How*
aver, the very existent ich a situation is m
mm*m*+mmmmi*m \m*Hmmwimmtmmmt iim*mi -,m\t$m\>
shti ton, D. C. nt of Defense ,
, 3.954), <- .

errors in estimating requirement 05 while a refined control system
will ultimately improve estimates f there ??till remains a necessity
for initiators of requirements to use est of judgment end
thorough planning if we are to conserve resources*
one of the great sins of bureaucracy is the minute detail
with which instructions are prepared • either r all avenues
of escape or to counteract for the abdication of responsibility
by subordinates, ^.ch detail is also characteristic of many of
our procurement specifications* Overepeelfieatlon of requirements
can be one of the costliest items in procurement .3 It is for
flr«l infrequent that a standardised commercial Item would fit
r n®<?.&* as well as an item for which we -ribe elabora*;
special requirements* (Mb requirements not only result in v^ry
high unit costs but often us© resources unnecessarily* In many
cases we demand a luxury whlcfe we do not neM or cannot afford*4
In any case, such requi -ts create great suspicion in the minds
of Congress*, industry, Sad public concern"7 estimate? of
real need. In addition, they drive up prices and deprive us
funds to buy materials which '.tight contribute more to firepower*
Considerable effort is directed toward r methods of
storagc f maintenance, m(i utilization , but the large
amount of correspondence circulating throughout our forces con-
cerning these subjects Is mute evidence that responsible officers
I m i « 1 1 1 11 1 I » »i» « I im imii I i n. ii n » ill ii iiiii m iin nn n imnii»i» m w i »imi m i j ihih ii « I ii i<inmi« m » i» » n ill Mi n
3Paul H* Dougla
,




frequently sake insufficient effort toward f mater-
ials.^ As a lt f replacement \ots are inflated. In
Individual eases, the amounts msy be small, but the aggregate is
probably & considerable sum. • do wasteful upkeep pf*«*
tices bring about hi requirement;: its
but the usage rate for certain materials may be diametrically
osed to the ability of industry I >vide a*4
iaents 9 especially during isftvtl
The point to be stressed is that no matter from what
origin military requirements :erived, it is imper that
we examine them crit. 'ore converting them to materials
and personnel. Requirements based on wast i Uiidereticns in
peacetime win f laekl&| enlightened reasoning, r-
able scarcities of needed materials during war, A component * ust
be nr^Iuclble in the quantity require*; a simplicity \
does not bring about unsatis
(
space, or personnel
employment $ require for
materials .th storage ar station which
can be provided »]
times of war the military effort r«-ns headlong into cor,:petitl
for materials wit's slty for I l 9
merchant s many other articles required to m&
and move th© tools of war. To average military officer these





to make t: It o.r our resources, be ©Blightc 9 s««
at least a part of the field outsicU ©sent narrow vision.

CHAPTER ?
Among most officers of the naval service, it would prob-
ably be a unique idea to consider military or civil service man-
power as a military or an economic resource. If we had a small
completely voluntary peacetime force, such a concept t not be
necessary. However, the large size of our military force, c - -
bined with that reluctant attitude of the American people
repels them free military service, brings about a natural com-
petition with civilian labor and professional forces which, in
fact, does make manpower an elementary and scarce resource. hen
It is considered that the pay of military and civilian personnel
makes up approximately half the present expense of the tlavy, con-
servation of personnel becomes a primary concern in reduction of
itary costs. If we consider the quality of personnel as well
as the quantity, certain categories of manpower may overshadow
all other resources in importance. That the strength of military
and civilian forces has tended to be insufficiently controlled is
attested by Congressional ceilings on both.* That some of our
manpower may not be utlli .0 attain t imary purpose of our
service is Indicated ry the extremely high ratio o *t per-
sonnel to personnel in actual combat units. In any case,
seem sure that i are never enough personnel to go around and
-*—
1
There are indications that Congress may lift its ceiling
controls when Department of Defense financial controls reach the
point wh*T* they • .Ively perform the same function.
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that we have the best of justifications for maintaining our
strength in its present proportions. Bat is this always true?
In what ways are we wasting personnel or obtaining less productiv-
ity than vo should reasonably expect? . hy do we need to be con-
cerned with competition with the civilian labor and professional
forces? iJ,or the answers to these and allied questions rmnpower
resources iHX be discussed under two headings? (1) ' carcity f and
(2) Costs.
(1) Scarcity of .Manpower . The scarcity of manpower may
be viewed from various angle*, hortages may be relative m not
enough personnel to orwide the desired convenience, not enough
to do the job wa^ft . or not enough just to do the job. They aay
involve the abilities of sien - not enough competent people or
dependable people. Scarcity amy involve the attractions of the
service for tJ.ose who are eli;. to join it. 'rem most any
angle, the llavy apparently suffers from scarcity of manpower. In-
vestigation of the causes for deficiencies shows that some of
n are internally bred and some are not directly under our con-
trol. It is the internal gy f causes in which we should be
most interested, for if we can correct the% automatically we siay
rectify many of the external difficultly
Our national policy now appears to be slanted toward a
moderate dcfensl rcc coupled with a force capable of atomic
retaliation in case of attack. for larently requires

—2o—
In the neighborhood of o million military and one million
civil service personnel over a long period of time, AI
some conditions rjhich form the basis of large wars do not ore- ~
cntly exist t this fore© is designed to deter larr,e-scale aggrcs-
sive tendencies and to contain sporadic localized hostilities if
should break out. Alor an armed force in ,
it appears that we will maintain a considerable program of
foreign and military aid to our allies
•
these pro-
grams on our normal civilian economy is likely to produce budget
deficits in many o I years to follow if tax receipts arc not
large enough to balono . , Jgct surpluses are un-
likely because of great pressures to reduce taxes*) As a result t
it is probable that slightly inflationary conditions, considerable
defense production, and nearly full employmen' 1 continue over
several years* In terms of manpower this means continn en
competition between civilian m Mtary activities for personnel
services,2 It means continued necessity for the draft "or
acceptance of many onnel *ttfe lot Intel- ;.onal
standards. It means continued high turnover of younz officer I
enlisted personnel unless the working conditions and c on
are improved enough to compete with civllle: ortunities. It
probably also means that, if no combat conditions arise ever a
Ion iod of time, there vdll hi unintentional but natural
i«M«wmw««i m nwn
-obert C* Goodwin, "^anoo. .•oblems in Defense.
duction", xjfre Aanpla. ^...ithp.. hmz^n '!^wy Pf.fflU.Uc.tiL




slackening of emphasis on operational dutlc i increase in
administrative or bureaucratic order and precision. All these
factors are highly expensive and result in less firepower for the
tax dollar than should be possible if military manpower I itions
>e more desirable,
*e we to be engaged in another larce war, it is entirely
probable ttttt we would face a manpower mobilisation even greater
than in World ar II , and mny plans for such mobilize tlon have
already been formulated, toting simultaneously Ml world ~>rsenal
and in a world-witf itary effort, the ability of our population
to fill the manpower requirements would be put to a test that
might amount to a struggle for survival #3
other in conditions of war or cold war, we therefore
have an obligation to use as few men as efficiently as possible
to do each required job. We hope that the American public and
other activities of the government are facing the m realis-
tically. In our own service I can set the pattern. Manpower
needs must be built realistically with attention directed to the
ultimate mission of the Havy. i'inc ppiy does not meet di
conservation measures must be exercised. In what manner can t:
Navy proceed to improve upon its manpower requirements? ugh
the ideal would never be reached, our efforts ou^ht to begin from
3
Edward A* i-ltaoatrick. 'U&npower and Atomic V.'ar,"

the doctrine implied by answering the question, "hat and how
much does ray effort contribute toward ais ctlve fighting force
at the point of pressure or engagement?' 1 raw there we c a pro*
ceed to the mechanical processes of conservation of mar. »f
(2) Manpower Utilisation and Coats
>
Compensation for
military and civil service imnponev constitutes in the neighbor-
hood of one-half our present Navy budget* In times of war t
percentage drops in relation to procurement, but the cost of m&n-
power is still highly significant, I-Tflcient utilisation, the
fore. Is of primary importance on a cost basis as well as a con-
servation basis.
It has already been intimated that the fundamental condi-
tions for efficient utilization of manpower and materials are a
stable force with rood leadership attracted by adequate eomnensa-
tion, good rorlcin conditions, and reasonable advancement pros-
pects. To be sure, these are everyday goals even n • . Stat It is
herein submitted that changes in inter D and i. ~
mentation of these goals may achieve better manpower utilization
and reduce the pinch, of scarcity.
It lias been stated in various places that youn leers
and men are leaving the service for reasons snch as the follow:*.. .
(1) Too such time away from families,
(2) Insufficient compensation.
(3) To take advantage of veterans' educational benefits.
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(4) Availability of civilian employment (at good ^ages
and comper -oly permanent location).
(5) Other more isolated reasons.
Close ir. igatioo, newwve?| reveals that many personnel have
two other Important reason* which they feel privately but
heaitate to speak openlyi
(6) Respect for their military leadership which
lifted t. that require- l»tl«.S
<7) Reluctance to participate in a military endeav
which may bring them int -oan-typ*- le
their brothers at home continue a &&e«
It is likely that our high turnover is due in any S&4 cane to a
combination of these reasons. f course, the seventh reason
above was a matter of national policy and not within the Navy*s
*mH*m*>#w\m***m**iiu**mn\i»m tomwwiiiM.iiiM.iiiMW'MihMW^ti^^ mw
As a corollary it be noted that
given as their reason for leaving any of the foil'
much worl:; too la insufficient ^tunity for a ce-
ment t or overly or disciplinary requirement
It might even be -
enough worl.. -.r.; service consi
t'-'eir 'rm or some Lr COJ orori-
by the service becau I not ! is eon*
tr ;o diff:I ©d in justifying lar
diuir '-lie,
^This ia based on certein limited
writer durinr 195* when turnov:
mous separation qv .lires, intervie. tmI i
of information n units an attempt to
find primary causes as- or th re-enlistment ra\
oect for command and div*
contributory in a su 'sing number 6 oe< . ->e
leadership was obviously c. , re-enlistment tendencie:
willingness to follow, an tciency all i -ed better than
contemporary units not boasting this advantage.

control. The first three are presently subjects of thought
and proposed lc >n. The fourth is in large part due to the
magnitude of military services themselves; reduction of military
persor iit create en easier civilian labor market thus in-
duelng some individuals to remain in the service. But in
field of leaderchip f while it is the subject i ..-.?h attention,
resul'. ve not been whet is required to i late optimum
efficiency.
standing leadership is one of the most vital corner-
stones of e successful and efficient enterprise. That able
leaders csn accomplish more a minim' osources is almost
axiomatic. Yet we operate under an officer pi <\n& a
career rotation plan ~eem to do of our leadership
to mediocrity. Two changes in emphasis *&« I Irit
is to take grester advr
.
ton in the Officer
Personnel Act of 1947 allows up to five percent of
selectees for p ion to come from bale*? the promotion zone
on a basis of merit? perhaps thr -ntag<: I be I
creased. The sec Is to provi er selectivity for our
eoamand and s illeta - ;; r but abler
officers to remain longer tl & poi ; , bett.
guidance and greater stability. Both of these measures would
provide an incentive to outstanding achievement it 6 ot

now exist except in upper • -. . -\il& create :::er
respect for the service "aaders both inr r
the 22avy* It §4*tt§ probe. :
"
:
I It would :ct a foil i
I rson of | abili . vl drl an a ny
seeks —not the best-- but merely the ''very good" performance
of duty # It has been learned in many civilian a
a man will very frequently forego added and certain
privileges or conveniences i.C h« is stimulated Kit for
highly competent ler . ' i, ief i a need for hii
&rv& i KJld we apply this lesson, It
ieved thieve very significant economies in
training of replacement in the efficient operation of t
Havy's activities. But to I a need to alter our concept
4y officer in a given tscc has nearly equal lei lp
ano billties* To those i ay th&t moral .Id
suffer e i quel opnortu? .' •>, it
mi£) the ,gnBQr,tu:-:dtry i liable $ the men
» ffrove themselves more capable than others shoulJ receive
mere considers ti m and are I I it in ay
positions.
Leadership is the br. t Ich we ; to assure
its presence t able leaders moat be G ted ::iently
compete with the relative 1 ition of a- 1 life
6
A highly nder in recently made




and the future prospects of civilian err ah ere also
seeking able execut.1. owever, since we are Halted in funds
set aside for defense , Increases in -ffset
by reductions la ,' ' material -tion.
presently proposed pay increases for nilitary &n& civil service
sonnel are a typical c Lay re SAS in I 111 cor.-
pensate for I In order to remain within total government
budget limitations* S oduetlons - more necessary our
effort to orovl utilization of the personnel remain-
to us and the best leadership available.
The probl'. ovlng optimum employment qM olac
of persons on to government end large corporations* It
is I WVyvltlttg that a ten billion dollar eat* *:he
Harry i V« certain deficiencies, put same time they
shoul ' t out. .tated ta*i£e*j ©Ions are fre-
quently screened fron Iftiltti&g about certain deficiencies farther
down the line. It any even be th'.t some c. t 4 editions are
sanctioned,, At any rate, if « >riate 1. is applied, nany
shady areas may b® brought to light; wlti t In mill 'aw
suggestions for possible Improvement in manpower utilization m
presented bale*
.
Ise of supporting forces and the shore sent. —
It Is understood that many studies have been laade with the hope
of alterin : adverse shore-to-sea ratio of personnel. Changes
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In appropriation composition to Include costs of military ncr-
ael In funds of ittppartl&g activities rae; rpria'
n
economies.' Ill b< w*t units
and civil scrvi-. unaffected. Investigation
reveal Instances whet*® personnel c nilnue to be Ifled on the
basis of Korean War re its. 'or Instance, l
purchasing offie* attempts to manufacture in civil
service personnel in excess of Its needs In order to avert a r
ductlon in force and rrade structure. Certain fleet units con-
tinue specialisation of car- ! -etions oven I \ one
man may be to cover the . in more t. 'eld now
occupying two or sore personnel. Kan? supporting functions re-
quire extensive staffing even in peacetime, but expanded i e-
men ue to war should be examir. id induced ^here 9 le
when hostilities cease, rose --ht mi the
role of sany staff activities in not only settir actional and
co-ordinatlm: standards, but In actually Issuing interna,,!
ating instructions for unit cot.:qc:v . In man:- ->ects unit
commanders ar^ nam little more than monitors of specifIce tic
zm& reculctions, : ie other hand, the abdication or responsi-
bility by many unit comm: . -3 re- I in the aula: tat of
staff activities to the point ively participate
In the Internal operations of subordinate commands. A typical
7
,ritoiwM, Mmmmnti tin




example might be the case wherein a commanding officer is properly-
required to insure proficiency of his personnel along certain
lines. Although he has facilities available for accomplishment of
this requirement, he does not do so. Eventually several such
cases may result in establishing a staff-sponsored school with
its attendant heirarchy to provide the necessary proficiency,
unit commander is then given arbitrary quotas at times which may
be incompatible with other operational or training requirements.
The school may be set up at a central location which requires
travel. The work may require only three and a half days, but is
stretched to a full week for various reasons. Such an endeavor,
while necessary in some fields, may be over-extended to the point
of unacceptable inefficiencies and disruptions, not to mention the
immobilization of valuable personnel who in aggregate might go
far to provide another combat unit.
"cope of morale-type activities. — Certain activities are
provided in the service with the intention of improving morale.
Undoubtedly they do, but usually at significant cost to the unit
which provides them. Hobby shoos, movies, education services, and
athletic endeavors are wholescm* diversions for military per-
sonnel. Most often, however, they are not run on an extra-
curricular basis, but as regular duties for personnel involved.
th the possible exception of education, which returns direct
benefits to society, most of these activities shoulc1 be, insofar
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as possible, self-support' outside
Off, Personnel require operate ho I recreational
movies S'.oul proceeds for their t -tin*
services. Athletic venturer: -nidi not interfer ^;he normal
operations of a expand as ti.ey do in frequent cages. A man
assigned I athletic I Is
command durii fe 1 •.
-oductivity. —» There are several forms of lost time
which, if exploited, might add ten to fifteen percent to the p:
otlvity of many organisation:- * ty day -.th effec-
tively loses about one out of the twenty w i ^ In a son'
for a large portion of the personnel in certain commands, Al*
though a few fisc ' Otmtl would be inconvenienced twice per
month, out 6 by holding ;sy just before
or at the end s hours. A -.usher of
dependents seem unable t© visit the doctor or th i ry
wii beinr M led by their husbands.
lost lr these processes Its in I a?y increases in
complements to provi- r such speci- -s. It -
t curtailment q ice would . Increase a uni'
outnut. The practice of granting leaves heglnnln; at 0001 on the
day of departure (a "v-orK lay*) anc at mi -m the
last day grants many extra days of leave in exe* r»
ity granted in ?rces Leave Act » particular'.-. ra]
short leaves of I -?ken # Th© extensive pv

allowing laundry, change, i sonal~type excur-
sion* Snarls rklng hmtt bo fees ads upon the
work weekj oonple are ad;}ur for it. It is
estimated that the avers go irork week of naval personnel ashore
is about thirty-five hours i *ek t exelusiv - sanding
duties, but i tl&g lor t- time activities. It ir Lag
that **e require so many people to accomplish s?hat we do. And it
is not surprising that such information -massed I the public
by dischargees creates a 1 >f confidence in defense r
meats. Although we tolerate lax we >::-ic@s, we can't afford
them.
chools. — This has already <\ alluded to in part ii
cussin;.* staff requirements* I aerates a very
ressiva line of schools, both ashore '
.
•©
is a serioi' .stlon, I
,
that we e
ani the luxury o ny of such special' tion as
ere offered. Invc.
I
reveal ©b ion e'
responsibility on the part of unit commands 1 ^ries
and the over-extensi .its in other t WrtSUKf study
of >bl«a asight prove the feasibility of contracting for
certain school activ now staffed and instructed by military
personnel.
•tent of unit subdlvisi< . mm Tim ti rid-
ard reason given for the present of subdlvic*-'
into many ports or subcommands is that training Is accomplished

for more o ar** thought t. be given to
the possibility ox* reducing the extent of t rubdivision In the
event of emergency or hostilities rherc conservation of critical
manpower would result.
Botation of operational units, — carious- consideration
might be givon to stationing d ents and operating units
permanently in foreign waters. Scee of the objections arising
from disruption of families by deployment to the Western Pacific
or to the iViediterranean might be partially alleviated, and the
costs of frequent ro ht be reduced. , "aetlce
might also result in the spread of American philosophy abroad 9
not to speak of the enhanced knowledge of foreign areas which
would be available to generations of de ren.
Empire buildinf, — fcataaX MEg&r* build' it exem-
plified by the practice «f the Civil Service; in seal!
its grades upon the size of the organization supervised* :er $
military personnel accomplish a similar effect by oveivsp' U*
zation &nd by providing for I number of infrequent contin-
gencies. In addition to the K&tf staffs, an porting
activities already mentioned there Is a widespread praetic 'eh
?lves extra personnel in obscure functions "just to fill out
all watch sections" or to "provide a relief In case of leave or
other absence. ** Many of these are thoroughly Ji




:>cr work* — Tver-load of pa* svl is like the
weather - everyone disc ut f«w do anythin :Trete a;:
it # There is still to- b redissemlnatlon Of written i. s»
tlons b-. '>rdin#te commands. HJu'.;t-in-case" reports and over-
distribution of refuse. ->verelasEification of 1: for-
mation causes workloads out o: oror>ortian to the importance
ih of the c ified material. Ho Utopian solution 1$ offered
here | yet continued pressure on the problem is mandatory for it
ties up thousands of yr. in unproductive effort.
The areas outlined above do r f any means constitute
a full list of the avenues I 9 conservation of manpower
•
effects of improper utilisation of mnpawmr are as Bach or
more by ourselves than by oublic. Hot only do we have to be
satisfied with less capable people who cause us acre headache -,
but withdrawing them from the civilian economy effectively raises
our own co living; increased labor costs due to competiti
for labor are almost invariably paid by the con?
The comments of Field Marshall Montgomery are pertiner
to navies as well as armies
t
The iV * . • ore by a ' L«
administrative setup in end around staffs are far t
bin the amount of paper Is required to produce
quite small action is terrific, lost
art of command, other then by . 9 ordinary man can
read half the paper that is in circulation! * doubt if the
other half is worth reading
All this must be tackled ruthlessly.
r
Id Marshall Viscount Montgomery, ^me
Allied Commander in Burope- in an address delivered to t) Ll*
fornia Institute of Technology f November 29, 1954 (U. . wa and





* . . ".conomy on no hand, by which a certain income
is maae .'-intain a man genteelly, and ueste on the other,
by *?hlch f on ineoR'. , ftmotl ©r man. lives shabbily,
cannot be defined « It la a very nice thir I one mn i*esrs
his coat out much sooner than another, ' mot tell hov:,1
Samuel Johnson 1 a observations are apt? ssme ©en (or activ-
ities) accomplish much more on their Incomes (or allotments) than
do others. But thou could not "tell how,*1 we are attempt!
to diagnose the reasons an- correct the causes*
though monetary controls are presently the chief method
of regulating the utilisation of resources, attention in this
treatise has so far been primarily directed toward complementing
the monetary control function by institution of a program which
old educate the av I military mn in : utilization of
"ical (including human) resources. rver, for \ o
deal or think in monetary terms, the function- rollership
^ill afford greater igptil as a means of a< lug efficiency
than does cons* >m of resources by voluntary methods. ?or
one thing, it is a direct and concrete approach to th- tm
lem. For another, it has the happy effect of reaching; more
people than the educational approach. Indeed, it cannot be said
that a certain amount of education * ill not follow the more dir
-.'oaoh*
r
-ven so, education in conservation of physical resources
James Boswoll, ifoff, JMJta, gL >p;l,
,
JofaaMP (Garden Ci'
Hew Yor -abletr 1 Company, i c>46), 449.
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accomplished in coincidence with the spread of monetary controls
should accelerate us toward our goals if economy. In the next
chapter explanations are
-=cd to Kfeov hem the two effo: ;y
be tied together.
It is not intruded in this paper to delve deeply into the
theories of monetary control thro 'inancial management or
comptrollership, uch matter is already ly ex ed2 and
constitutes a brood enough subject far i voir in itself*
To be sure, financial management is our institutional and mo.
direct means of achieving efficiency, but its ities re
a high state of training which cannot ry officer in
the service. Therefore, we shall be satisfied in this 1 :r
v.lth examining the w l considerations Involved in the avail
bility of men-. wfl its relationship to eth* -?rces.
oney exists as a means to facilitate the ex* • -c of
commodities and services. >t, of course, accomplish any-
thing directly. Inst- ', it is a common denominator be-
materials and manpower * a a ctor la
measure the relative values of materials and physical or nor.-..
effort, up manpower ,3 Accordin-.ly, the first measure af se
of our defense establishment is the dollar value of its an -ia-
tlon expenditure . vigh the quanti 'sand, si
or instance, 'Inancial MftaftfieRgnt foy,, T^flt, BJC
Defense and various departmental manuals ana instructions.
3Bums, fleal and Watson, lVMma ^cgrvoalcst second i
?r York i Harcourt, Brace and Company, K53), II, 89-91.
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os ships, aircraft, vehicles, installations, and reserve stocks of
ttj are ale? >ortant in -consideration'
,
are
matters of hi :.'liey upon whl#ij aver: llitary man r
little inf/ fl h aggregate service economic
creased availability of .funds through aggregate savings can result
in re-evaluation of polio:" \ning to levels of assets main-
tained This, of eour .;<?., facet of the problem of incroa.-
ing our available firepower within the limitations of resources
available. To achieve aggregate- eennoaies*. however* it is neees-
eary to practice conservation of all r*so&PC< i f including t
disposition of our variation* The effects of oro-*sr
utilisation of materials! and manpower have already been dl ed,
but it should be repeated here that economies effected in these
areas can be converted through money savings to greater firepower*
If the number of tactical units maintained is considered sufficient
to support our national policy, then appropriations and p. ly
taxes can be re a - say be diverted ", * civilian
needs, usually, I i , military planners feel that no isatter
how muc.'
s
It is i I* inoe the funds available
arc> usual'- ited by economic and political conditions,
it is therefore incumbent upon us to create the maximum number of
combat units e monetary limit*
The two SJ -onditure categories a -^rsonnel e« -
pensstion and procurement, Beth have been di v ed in previous
chapters *lth the accent placed on conservation a
careful formulation ftf requirements which r<? procurement

of goods or services* It should here be -island that economies
In those fields can bring about diversion ^unds to more profit-
able employment as well as alleviate scarcities. In the field of
manpower | for instance, t.ion may show a per. -re ex-
tracting for civilian services may save both funds ilitary
or civil service personnel* In procurement, the utilisation of
personnel with good business experience and the application of
ropriate timing and bargaining techniques may save money in
areas of contracting, renegotiation! buying at the source, and
finding the "best buy*1
,
as suggested by Senator Douglas.4 J.
other expenditure categories we must be equally diligent to obtain
for our mon: About indulging in luxury or fill' ft*
reasonable requirements.
• seems to -evalent among man? of our personnel a
notion that appropriations are a sort - in each
group request and justify a maximum budget to insure that
its own interests are not invaded by others. uch a notion en-
visions many seniors in military command tad Congress in general
as having little concept of the requirements of the group con-
cerned. Peps- L in this ^roup see budgetary per' 3 and
>ss as hatchet organizations which are sc; eonomy for
economy's sake; inflated requirements are the result.




conomv to th« ?^,U,mI , . .matt
The University of Chicago Press, 1952) 1?4-1?7.
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not generally the case. The reasons behind attitudes of this sort
usually stem frost 1b-:: knowledge or conception of necessary
balance &n& relative importance of various activities composing
e whole security effort, Many, of course, neat differ-
ences of ODlnIon f but evr the lac'" •:nderstandins Oft> be
IleaMe. It Is of vital rtancc that peffl 7. be mad© to
realize that we can be provided with ftur less than re desire even
In actual fightinr; forces, and selfish interests must give way to
an attitude of support for a balanced, cohesive whole* It must
be understood that Congress is as Interested as we are that
adequate defense Is provided?
are always ftffftl* iy may Impair cur national
defense or at I iftt we accusec ryin




Department will criticize us and our oolitic
hctse will say, rut m\
you voted to weaken the pr ran o United
tes •". If 8 a rtain
that fata Is not ng the Ity o ... country, ha is
afraid he will' be accused of doing so.-?
Indeed, it is Interesting to note that Congress is presently ecu*
cerned that President Eisenhower may have reduced the military
budget too far, and demands have teen voiced to investigate
matter thoroughly. Ilitary personnel must further understand
that budgetary Halts are prescribed within the ability of the
nation to provide military preparedness along with other necessary
programs. To clear away some of the clouds surround! osent
impression should examine the source of our funds*
i wwi »>wi "mn>iiniiw " ' » i ! ' i iwill»i« iwi Wiwwn ' n»m«wm^i*«)Bi»ifcim i ntWi m+ mmnm.imwmi M u\m*>m<jmmm**+*Mm*mmm»m*mi*<*u*m^»m*i*M'**mimtmm*m*
Ibld. t 140,

Most of our personnel appear to think that Congress appro-
priates funds In relation to those of our requirements which they
approve and then in turn sets tax rates which will pay for the
expenditures authorised. To some extent this is true. However,
this concept does not account for the fact that there is a maximum
tax load which the nation will bear under a given set of conditions
Opinions vary as to what the limit of this load actually is, and
probably no one is omniscient enough to stats it precisely.
Ince the vast majority of our citizens -?• as little
government as possible except in their own vested Interest, and
since - if think about it - they are essentially In pursuit
of a peaceful advancement or their civilization, they are reluc-
tant to bear taxes fcfl >ort government (including military}
services. The amount which they will bear is usually that which
provides I status quo or gradually rising standard of living and
which provides reasonable Incentives to invest risk-capital and to
business expansion.
Taxes should preserve incentives. They should leave
enough margin between the return to the ambitious, on the
one hand, and the slothful, on the other, to bhb bltlon
definitely worth while % they should ~How enough return to
the successful risk-taker over that to the "safe" investor
so that risk-taking is definitely worth while. to
Having in mind. . the distorting effects which taxes
in excess of 50 per cent can have on corporate investment
and expenditures, vt believe that the rate should be reduced
at least to that level.'
^Harold If, Groves, gfisfffiajg Btftttlon 4Pd ,Eft<m«ta.(T9CT<aW
z Company, Inc., 1946), 373
.
(K*w Tork and London: McGraw-Hill liook




o e , fiMSMt lifottonjQ ^fiVJTlty ftffi: , "g8Bs^fi. l Sifl"--- -
aitt-: • '•:? conomic Development, oanuary x /;>*>, <*. »

The extent of tl- :rovlsic: 11, of couple, vary wit -rid
and economic conditions and somewhat with traditions. Due to
present economic and political conditions thr I ti T;orld
and to development of our tradition of aid to freedom-seekir
peoples, we now support rather larg- -s while maintain!
steadily advancin'" » enty-odd years ago vf -1 in
session with an isolationist policy and a relate - low tax
burden, Cince the end of the Korean War 'Administration has
frequently re»evalu&io-d fcha nation's position in relation to
domestic and foreign pressures * ".• S free b- he
electorate and from business have pressured for reduction of taxes
to further peaceful civilian aims, ftHPftlfn pressures, tra are t
have noaewhat abated. In response to these Ohfti conditions,
the Eisenhov/er Administration has lowered personal income taxes,
some excises, and certain business taxes, and further reductions
are sought. In I >rt li the budget as nearly as
possible In balance, the administrati B curtailed certain
^cvernmant expenditures and at this vritifig la rorlrin^ $n *•* *
Of these government expenditures well half go for military
defense, ana the remainder are dlvidee Irly fixed charges
for nt dc ants, for veterans benefits,
for interest national debt, and for aid programs. Though
some small reduction? a be made in certain a -ograras,
by far the greatest area for pruning lies in military preparedness!
Thus our military a--, -lations deoend not ao I <:i;ent

of our requirements? fch Cot; .'.ling I - out on
what the ft&alttlj t Tor a budget ceili
Our biggest headache at sent* of course, he
budget, fhi -tldent has set the celling st 14 billion 4
against the pared down r- reaent t in of 16 bil-
lion 9. I Mi frank te , however, II tat
sympathy r,lih hiza because he li t to spend acre
tats we take in in 1 is a -^ey .man II ? I
aaw one, and believi: I do that we cen't afford
-ok
our economy in the proce the "cold war,"
there la much to ". la thesis of holding &t
.ling to -ibsoiutc ;ity«
. „ m
"
Though In isolated case ess will appropriate funds over and
above the Presidents budget recommendations, the leadership in
Congress is usually p to tailor their sv -isationa fairly
el- o that r. ended, or to slightly redu tali Ot ceurse
Lltftty p«9f -Cluenee increases in appropriations
throi?/ rtlnaoy before acaoitteea of Congress, bu lent
may withhold certain increase: nriaea and is
budget. It r.ust be - ered that military service?; carry out
the policies of it. . -&ander-ln- * , a President, In the
final analysis, 13 , it rhould be borne in mind t"
siae of our ailitf -eraed by two basic civilian
force . atem I I ny®rt
(1) The ant, aa a result of ibltc
opinion, evaluated against the counsel itio&al :rlty
Council, other civilian oi'.'icials I Joint Chiefs of Staff.
<2) To a lesser extant, the will -seel
. ough their elected representatives in Congre:




His an*; . . -eld ( - 5r i ),
536-$37» • letter addressed to Chairman Walter G.^ Andre?
of the House Ariac I tea Comsilttc , D or 13, 194

It should be recognised that one of the great pressures
involved in limiting government expenditures is the urge to balance
the budget. By all caving expenditures greater than tax receipt
inflation is invited. It is axioraati*- ! Inflation raises %\
ftf living for consumer, 'ness* an '.'litary all] ,
cept in actual am Willi ) certain
luxuries and incentive:', it is poll Xy &n& (in part) Monoel*
cally expedient to hold expenditures as nearly as possl Lb
balance with tax receipts. In effect, n, a milit it
look to the people themselves - business, unions, press I
*ess f and other Hi - to determine vhy his fv :^re
limited as are. Be should be familiar a* less to
understand business cannot in per d the
point where a reasonable return can be made on inv.- ' fcal
and t! p 1st risk capital can bo I tieas continue
to receive cone -ich Increase the -is bought
by the government, t . educi; I quantity of defense within a
given dollar limit | pressure groups demand and get goverarent
services which effect the military slice of V tal bt ( the
-;ress, by its information and impressions, influences the will of
the people | and the ordinary taxpayer want cuts to fei
refrigerators, television sets f et cetera. And he should remember
that he himself is one hose tar houlcl himself
good he as a taxpayer is getting out is subordinates
and out of his equipment? could he benefit by a tax cut or an

increase in pay brought about through economies effected by him-
self end many others lik© him in the service $ or has he been util-
ising personnel and materials which bj be better used to fill
a blank spot in our national preparedness ff suiasiarlsas
# # A sound economy cannot be maintained beneath a
crushing? burden of taxation, particularly If a rsiajor part of
that taxation must go in ncaeetirae to non-productive :ailit*iry
expenditures* Nor can the national norale be maintained if
terrific taxation eliminates incentive* If we devote in
peacetime too large a part of our rear r and. alth
to preparation." ' mr our standards af livii 111 remain
itia or will 'ise. A le whf- "or
a better life have been frusl- i le;
their morale will crack in time or crisis."
If these ideas can be injected into our
3
they will have
a better appreciation of what military a rlatlons siean and
t appropriations should achieve*
9
*ldwinf The Prl , w York and
London? Harper and Brothers, 1?4>.), 291,

chap* n
The prominent role of United States Armed Forces In advis-
ing and garrisoning I i I free weari M* - p II has
drawn continuous and intense attention from the public. The very
sise of these forces and the taxes necessary to support them have
created a pressure for drastic economy* As a result of their time
in service durin rid ' ar n f several millions of citizens
developed a conviction that I w*r* vast areas where greater
efficiency could be developed. !?hey applied pressure to develop
it. In such a climate imny old and nm ideas for achieving econ-
omy were unveiled in at ti to bring forth the magic formula.
In the laid st of these efforts the concepts of comptrollership ^Tid
performance budgeting were developed and adopted In defense. By
now they arc becoming widely loao^n in the service; yet t'.ey are
seldom understood, Xo the uninformed these oonccpts conjure up
pictures of economy drives. And to such people ec - is an
odious term whiaa means tribulations and reductions* It is this
attitude as much as any other counteracts efforts toward
ec nomyj the people who have It need to be re-educatef.
onoray Implies an optimum exploitation of available
military resources which will provide the best national security
obtainable and yet regain in balance with civilian efforts to
advance the common welfare. Our ability to achieve this sort of
economy Is being reflected through the growth of comptrollership
and performance budgeting techniques in the cervices,
m '; k m

Comptrollership, or financial management, has been developed
as a function whic'i aids and advises command in the efficient em-
ployment of resources. A Department of Defense manual due for
distribution In the near future states it in this wayi
A financial management system should not seful to
command but should afa wide assurance that 11.
sources will be utilised most effectively In terms of national
licy, A major problem is that of attaining; harmonious
balance between the normal commercial concept of management
with profit incentives and emphasis upon efficiency and
onomy, on the one hand, and the military concent o ile
adequacy, on the other,1
In coding with the problems of financial management, the c
trollor ^111 need to seek full cooperation of operational and
staff personnel toward development of attitudes in ??hich a spirit
of economy will thrive. ;, rollership t in its broad sense, is
not restricted, to -'ork of the comptroller or his f* The
commander of any military organization must h:* ' P set the ex-
ample and policy which will permeate his command; his staff comp-
troller coordinates the mechanics of the function. Each person
in a command must be taught that he imself a ^ller of
sorts and that he has an individual responsibility for carrying
out his phase of the commander's economy policy. It is emphasised
that this responsibility is reflected through the chain of command.
The commander must hold his command assistants responsible for
effecting economic use of resources. He will use bis staff o
troller as a catalyst and coordinator in t) 'ort.
ington t DVCT, Department of , November 1954TD

In developing the climate in which comptrollership attitudes
will thrive, there must be more than the mere institution of mechan-
ical systems. The. i :ist be education* It is the comptroller who
must lead the way. That he has a vested interest in materials and
manpower as well as their common denominator, money, will not be
easily understood by operators. But it must be made clear that
oemptrollership is not merely record-keeping. It is the active
search, wherever necessary, for the most efficient an • aomleal
means for running a command with due considers ti rational
commitments and morale. Only by utilizing a well-conceived educa-
tional (or salesmanship) program will such a e rollership con-
cept be accepted in a spirit of harmony and cooperation. If
can educate toward the ideal that each njan has a share in the
coaptrollership function, we shall go far in the development of
optimum utilisation o :* resource .
Another important facet of the comptro; - ip attitude
lies in the field of public relations. Utt© national security is
orvice provided to civilians in consideration of their wlf*
the public attitude must be kept before us. To receive the con-
tinued support and confidence of taxpayers and Coar.ress in our
endeavors, they must be convinced that we are aecomplishin
most with the resources available to us. They must also feel that
we have their interest at heart. Here again the comptrollership
function is a key factor. By der and practicing t!
economy expected of us, the impressions cart nwm the public mind
are most apt to be desirable. Increased backing and respect for

2-
the military should \ sit. Still a further exten-
sion of the public relations job is the comptroller's position as
collector and disseminator . Information provided by a
comptroller can b- creat significance in associations of ca.»
raanders with citizen groupc. -. actual information concern'
watchfulness over the taxpayer's dollar is always v?ell received
by Hotsrians or any other local group in day-to-day contact





In accomplishinc any major objective, it la highly necc •-
aary to have both the machinery and the support for that machinery
if we are to achieve any outstanding success in our venture,
it is with the philosophy of economy in defense. It is probable
t nor- as have given a great deal of lip-service and a
modicum of effort toward achieving real economy in the servl
Financial management, however , is an increasingly important field
in the armed forces, and the doctrines of comptrollershi^ are
spreading rapidly through many sectors of service activity.
present, the field of comptroller is our bo sic machinery for
brlngi-. out econoEsyf it la the weapon with which we join the
encounter wit to. But just as in the Korean var where we had
i machinery but net the support of the various nations involv
to unify Korea, so comptroller ski? activities can bring about o
parti;: conomy. To support the mac; \7, we
r>er attitude or ( i many officers as
porsibl* 'Id be sufficiently indoctrinated to acquaint tlr
with their places in the na^on&l (as well as military) effort and
to support t" nceots of economy &nft scarcity of resourc.--,
Mental attitude is half our battl
Education of our officers need not follow a formal pattern,
It should perhaps follow an approved outline from centra 1 authority,
but the actual Instruction could be given as a series of lectures




for qualities of perspective and breadth of inform tion f would be
logical instructors in many ares a* The economy officer in fleet
units rsight be the appropriate officer. In any case, education
3hould h he support -er in eonaand , be carrl ut
by taMMMfegCftg* personnel 9 and should utilise material at least as
broad in scope as envisioned in previous chapters of this paper.
At present the term economy has the rather perverted connotation
of reduction in force, a sort if starvation with attendant tribu-
lations. Its meaning i roadened to indicate not only
leiency but provision of a resets not now available through
tvliigi in resources ftgft expended without significant nrofit. By
en] ning personnel concern" to relative importance of otl
phases of national endeavor, broadening may be at 1 in
part ace* -shed.
Not least in our considerations should be our efforts in
public relations. Scat 9ttm the nractice 'c relaticos
Is a subtle tie.. , "V 11 acquainted with the usuel
f«r»l of public relations functions - rele- • , I relations
with rwa m a*ti011*1 v is gr h ., boy scouts,
etc; bat the greatest field lies in Croatia impressions in
the minds of the ithin the- service that they carry the best of
pensions bac T . civilian taxpayer. The confi and
Ccngrer - lie ctm best be wen by demonstrat-
we are giving them the In ible tti 11a




Any scheme for improving economy needs the best of leader-
ship for suecesr. ^sponsible positions ntttt be coveted enoi.
to require strong efforts to attain th«S« Though we probably vlll
encounter a considerable amount of mediocrity in a defence estab-
lishment ent lls«| we id take particular pains to
counteract this shortcoming by fillinc? our wore xnsible
leadt Qlet- j selective basis. Stability of
good ! "ship would not only stre m our morale but i
correct a considerable number of unecono 1 ' ' ractices now
no intent in this >• derogatory
toward i 11 shed institutions or to impugn otives of per-
sonnel. On hanr-, tl r has re i certa-1
re-r for the advancement orts toward maximum
efficiency, ftueh Nil already been done* and. gradual ress
-'itlnue whether Of not all requirements are met. It ft
,
herein will provide
tGBtftl stimulus to accelerate our already rolling motion
I optimum i "iy.

mBaldwin, tans oe*-
. ,;: .eg. %t$ PPJlttogLlJ&g ?Vl9® ,Qg
SMHTUr fa *^ A^M&B V. * Clare;;iont, California!
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